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I dedicate this thesis to Oanh, without whom I would still operate under the comforting
assumption that I had achieved a complete realization, thinking of ethics as little more
than a tragic joke.

“Life doesn‟t want to be healed. The negative therapeutic reaction is fundamental to it.
Anyway, what is healing? The realization of the subject through a speech which comes
from elsewhere, traversing it.”
-Jacques Lacan, Seminar II, p. 233
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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the complex role of ethics within Psychoanalytic theory, finding not
a prescriptive ethics, but a reference to ethics in the cathartic methodology that I argue
underpinned Psychoanalytic thought from the very beginning. The introduction provides
the reader with the necessary background to the material to be covered. The first
chapter examines the neglectful attitude found throughout the foundational writings of
Psychoanalytic theory in the work of Sigmund Freud, as well as covering two different
methods by which ethics are often reduced, and which Freud successfully avoided. The
second chapter seeks the origin of an alternative ethics in the traditional locus of
freedom and agency: the ego, and explains how this assumption is problematic. The
ego is shown to be surmounted through the cathartic method. The final chapter
examines the processes of post-egoic ethics, shows their role in the Psychoanalytic
relationship, and summarizes the entire project in the last two pages.
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INTRODUCTION: THE PLACE OF CATHARSIS IN PSYCHOANALYSIS
We may characterize Psychoanalysis as a cathartic practice1, insofar as it seeks
to discharge the pathologies of everyday life in order that free activity and association
might take their place2. “Catharsis” is a Greek term, which translates to “purification” or
“purging”, and refers in the context of Psychoanalysis to an abreaction/discharge of a
fundamental and pathogenic trauma (Laplanche & Pontalis, p. 60). This method,
although discarded in later formulations of Psychoanalytic theory, remained implicit in all
of them, insofar as they continued to emphasize the direction of Psychoanalysis as
guided by a desire for exteriority; a desire to exit a closed and stifling circuit. The
oppressiveness of psychoanalytic theory is precisely an attempt to escape this element
of experience by delineating it. Sigmund Freud‟s notorious emphasis on sexuality and
familial relations was a result of his discovery that the ossifications of desire, in
pathological states, follow certain patterns that lead to pathology through their constant
repetition. In the case of neurotics, who make up the vast majority of psychoanalytic
subjects, certain thought and behavioral patterns, often solidified at a young age, are
repeated incessantly, and this leads to psychological disturbance. The goal of
Psychoanalysis was (and is) not to inculcate these patterns, but to offer a path beyond
them, towards a true relation with the world and others in their exteriority, and without
sacrificing interior life to do so.
Psychoanalysis, like any meaningful system, has the potential to take us well
beyond impersonal duty and personal compulsion into a more broad, responsible, and
1

In spite of Freud‟s surpassing of the cathartic method to form the method later referred to as the “talking
cure”, an emphasis on the curative potential of catharsis, re-named “abreaction”, remained in his later
work, and remained a core principle of psychoanalysis.
2
Although Psychoanalysis achieves its cure through free association, free association is also a sign that it has
succeeded. Pathological states always impose their schema on discourse, making relation itself impossible.
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open-ended universe. This, as I will put forth in the pages that follow, lays the
groundwork for a true ethical practice and eliminates the twin possibilities of false ethics,
dedicated to top-down moralistic injunction, as well as to the bottom-up interior drives
which form a kind of “private despotism” reigning over the interior life of the afflicted.
If there is a process by which ethical spaces are opened up through
psychoanalysis, it would be through catharsis. The cathartic abreaction, which empties
the psyche of its excess cathexes, is a terrifying prospect for many who are initially
exposed to Psychoanalytic theory and method, in that it makes explicit many of the less
comfortable processes and objects involved in our day-to-day lives. The insights
provided us by its theory of pathology (in this singular focus on pathology,
Psychoanalysis was from its beginning a primarily negative theory, delineating
pathological states, with ideals always remaining on the periphery), have a tremendous
potential to arouse the fear of the philosopher or the philosophically minded. With its
scalpel, it peers under the goodness that is assumed to be provided us by our loyalty to
prescriptive formulas of ethics, to see if there is a hidden pattern of unconscious activity.
The possibility of a return of the repressed, or a perceptible uprising of unconscious
patterns, is a constant threat, and the higher we value our ideals, the more inaccessible
their sources seem, the less likely we are to acknowledge the possibility of this
occurring. Layers of distortion often cover the activity of the unconscious, placed as they
are with the goal of preventing disruptive material from entering conscious awareness.
When they do enter consciousness, they are often cloaked in reversals, denials, and
other means of obfuscating their true nature. The only way to peer beneath these
obfuscations is through interpretation. Ethical action itself often serves as one of the
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most common “masks” of unconscious activity, because it allows one to continue one‟s
activities unmodified while reassuring oneself of the justification of one‟s practices within
greater society. Ethics easily takes on a ritualistic character, becoming a form of
sacrifice of freedom encoded in widespread discourse. Through ritualistic compulsion,
the neurotic gives up their agency in order to reach regress comfortably to a stage of
primal dependency or omnipotence (this will be discussed at length in Chapter 3). The
language of the unconscious, however, stands out from these distortions involved in
traditional ethical discourse in that it “[…] speaks all by itself […]” (OSP, p. 70), while
traditional discursive ethics speak for us, offering us a static means to measure our level
of conformity to its codes and prescriptions. Although it is clear that ethics must involve
autonomy on one level or another, most ethical systems end up undermining this
autonomy by bringing them entirely into the domain of representational consciousness.
Pathology represents a troubling surfacing of this autonomy, this lack of representation.
Yet the goal of Psychoanalysis is not to decompose ethics by revealing its roots
in pathology. Instead, Psychoanalysis as it was initially set forth by Sigmund Freud and
further developed by Jacques Lacan, allows for the expansion of the study of ethics
beyond their usual confinement to conscious representation and into the domain of the
non-representational unconscious. By exploring the relationship of the unconscious to
ethical behavior, we can illustrate the possibility of ethics beyond prescriptivity, beyond
the rules that limit freedom. As is indicated by Freud throughout his writings, we may
find the inverse of what we would expect in the ethical by studying their practice and
their pathos, in that it is easy to sweep ethics up into the pre-ethical desires of the
individual. The unconscious has its own motives, and unless these are properly
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understood, we cannot make any assumptions about the veracity of any ethical system
supposedly subscribed to by an individual:
If anyone were to put forward the paradoxical proposition that normal man is not
only far more immoral than he believes but also far more moral than he knows,
Psycho-analysis, on whose findings the first half of the assertion rests, would
have no objection to raise against the second half (EI, p. 42).
Although the engagement psychoanalysis and ethics throughout Freud‟s work is almost
exclusively negative, with him mounting sophisticated critiques and exposés of the
embarrassing failures of ethics, it seems clear in the above quotation that he is not
unilaterally opposed to a positive ethics, as long as it can account for the unconscious
dynamics involved. One can speculate that Freud himself avoided going too far in this
direction on account of his fear of making his work susceptible to a construction of a
positive ethics capable of undoing his work on the unconscious. For the purposes of this
thesis, however, I have chosen to focus on a positive element in Freud‟s thought,
namely the cathartic underpinning of his theory‟s trajectory, which I see as linked to an
unspoken ethical impulse contained in the theory itself.
The cathartic method, utilized in early Freudian theory, provides us with a vital
path towards an explication, however paradoxical this may seem, of a powerful, positive
gesture towards ethics in the practice of Psychoanalysis, and this gesture may in fact
turn out to be more important than the specific elements of ethical practice itself3. After
all, we find good and bad people who subscribe to the entire spectrum of ethical beliefs.

3

It is important to note that the reference towards ethics does not imply either a positive or negative conception
of ethics, but rather discovers the ethical as the space which opens up during the course of psychoanalytic
treatment in which a previously inconceivable relation becomes possible between the ideal and the concrete, the
universal and the particular. Catharsis is the means by which this space opens.
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It would seem then, that what matters in the practice of goodness is not specifically
which rules are followed, but how they are followed, in what context, and this, the
virtuousness, the goodness, which is directly connected to the ideal that drives it,
cannot be taught (as Socrates so thoroughly describes in the Meno dialogue). We find
this gesture, or this reference towards ethics with a noteworthy absence of didacticism,
throughout the Psychoanalytic literature, but most noticeably in the work of Sigmund
Freud and Jacques Lacan. It remains an aporetic gesture, pointing towards something
hopelessly irresolvable, from a position which is even more irresolvable.
In what follows, I will attempt to continue this gesture, this reference, and
emphasize its profound significance for both the practice of Psychoanalysis as well as
ethical discourse in general. As a gesture, however, it is entirely different from the
prescriptive injunction provided throughout the ages in almost all post-Platonic
philosophy. It indicates that Psychoanalysis itself is not an ethical institution, and yet
every aspect of its practice and theory tends in this direction. As is the case with any
therapeutic system, it seeks to bring its analysands (clients) out of a “bad” state and into
a good one. Naturally, these concepts, of “bad” and “good” are rife with presumptions,
hopes, failures, and fantasies. The important factor is that clients, whether clients of
therapy of a psychological or medical nature, have acknowledged that something has
gone wrong, something is “in a bad way”. One does not seek treatment because
everything is good. Through therapy, a resolution the client seeks a resolution to this
trouble, and this resolution has as a guide, some notion of health, whether correct or
incorrect. The analyst, the therapist, is able find agency to cure precisely to the degree
that his or her notion of health is able to connect with concrete reality. It is important to
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remember, however, that psychological health is not to be expected of analysts and
psychologists any more than physical health is to be expected of physicians. All
therapies tend towards the good (the ethical) without being themselves good. Therapy
orients itself towards the good (as health), but there is no guarantee that such a good
can be secured. Doctors still get sick, and Psychoanalysts still lose their sanity. It is this
fact which reveals the deeply flawed nature of therapies.
The qualitative nature of the mind makes it more difficult to identify and treat than
the body. Any psychological theory then must resort to unusual measures to get at its
subject. This is especially the case with Psychoanalysis. The unconscious, by its very
nature, seems always to disappear into obscurity or distortion when approached
directly. To bring it into consciousness involves a lengthy and painstaking translation
process. The first step is to catch it. Hence, Psychoanalytic inquiry must typically
approach its subject matter from an unexpected angle, to surprise unconscious
processes during their routine activities, and take note of their patterns. Such strategies
are necessary for any study or treatment of the common neuroses. Work in the area of
psychosis calls for a different approach to the unconscious, which is readily apparent on
the level of consciousness, which has collapsed to a singular egoic plane.
Psychoanalytic practice thus operates in a topsy-turvy twilight zone, in which neither
traditional ethics nor meaning-structures can readily find direct application, and in which
the most primal of desires may find cathartic (i.e. purgative) expression. Psychoanalytic
catharsis would give the impression, in this case, of providing an escape from ethics. It
would follow from this that Psychoanalysis is either un-ethical or anti-ethical. This
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conclusion, however, in its haste, looks for ethics in the wrong way, and finding none,
concludes that there is none available to find.
The limitation of freedom through conformity to prescriptions provided by a
master (or master code) has little to do with the relation of Psychoanalysis to the ethical.
It should be clear that the analyst does not function as a kind of master in relation to the
analysand (client). Neither does it promote an unproblematic model of freedom that
would easily hypostatize into un-freedom. Such would suspend the possibility of ethics
occurring at all. There can be no ethical model, no formula capable of offering
homogenous responses to “trolley problem” style ethical questions which proliferate in
contemporary ethical discourse, and which presuppose subjects stripped of the agency
to make ethical decisions. If ethics is openly discussed by a Analyst, it can only be in a
highly tentative tone. One can only hope that the Analyst has a clear idea of what is
good. Just the same as any other therapeutic practice, confounding factors almost
always make an entrance at some point. These confounding factors cannot be
eliminated, but they can be thrown off balance, to prevent them from taking on an
authoritarian character which would suspend agency.
The relation between freedom and ethics is always aporetic, as opposed to
negative or positive. We cannot say that ethics suspends freedom, but neither can we
say that it enforces it. As Emmanuel Levinas pointed out, ethics begin where “freedom,
instead of justifying itself, feels itself to be arbitrary and violent” (TI, p. 84). In the
Psychoanalytic situation, there must first be an acknowledged freedom (in the form of
free association, a necessity for Psychoanalytic practice), and secondly, there must be
something beyond freedom which remains undefined by it, an Other, for which one is
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responsible. This Other is not found within analysis, but beyond it. If there is indeed
such a thing as Psychoanalytic ethics, it is not in posited norms, but in its promotion of
self-transcendence, in the sense that transcendence is never self-contained, but always
points beyond itself without positing the essence of this beyondness. Transcendence is
always transcendence towards an ideal never fully disclosed, but only approached as a
limit, much as in the incremental manner of a calculus.
In order to discover the ethical dimension of Psychoanalysis, however, we must
first learn to remove the veneer of that which falsely presents itself as ethics. Although
Psychoanalytic literature typically pays more attention to the unconscious as a
transgressive force, acting from below, there are at least as many unconscious
elements that function normatively, acting “from above”. Freud tells us “not only what is
lowest, but also what is highest in the ego can be unconscious” (GS, p. 217). The
“highest” portion of the ego (or that portion which approaches the superego) can easily
end up goading the “lowest” portion into taking action, and thus providing more
opportunities for future goading dynamics. This dynamic is easy to misinterpret as
ethics, while it is in reality little more than another twist in the libidinal organization of its
practitioner, allowing for the enjoyment of objects only in a closed system that posits
objects as simultaneously condemned as immoral and promoted as tantalizingly
transgressive. These “ethics”, bound by rules or a ruler, displace the agency of the actor
to the rules s/he follows, which determine the actor‟s acts. This pathological dynamic
may be distinguished from ethics proper which function not to promote tantalizingly
transgressive acts or to impose guilt (and punishment) upon them, but instead to free
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unconscious desire from undue reliance4 on cathected (i.e. predetermined) objects,
thereby allowing the subject to freely acknowledge its relation to the Other, or
exteriority. There is, however, a horde of factors that serve to prevent ethical relation
from occurring, the chief being confusion between cathected objects and exteriority.
Cathexis is the process through which “psychical energy is attached to an idea or
group of ideas, to a part of the body, to an object, etc.” (Laplanche & Pontalis, p. 62).
Through cathexis, the world of consciousness becomes invested with meaning and
desire. Without cathexis, desire would be free-floating, unattached to objects. It would
operate chaotically, without rhyme or reason. The cathectic process is a normal part of
the formation of an operative libidinal organization (in that it provides a structure for
desire to follow), but should not be mistaken for ethical practice, or the externalization of
desire. Only when released from an unmitigated focus on its own cathected structures,
does the relation of the self to the Other become explicit. But for any relation to occur at
all, there must first be a cathartic “purging” of any unnecessary cathectic dross, which
provides not true relations but imaginary ones, and leads to painfully nonsensical
ritualistic behavior and pathology. This behavior is characteristic of neurosis, and can
clearly be observed in Freud‟s “Rat Man” case history, as when the Rat Man becomes
fixated on cathected processes such as moving items off the road as well as with
providing the correct payment for a pair of replacement glasses to the correct party.
As Freud notes in his case study of the “Rat Man”, the Rat Man‟s neurosis
causes him to be:

4

The definition of “undue reliance on cathexis” is a matter of interpretation by the analyst or ethicist in
conjunction with the subject of the analysis or inquiry. It is my observation that “undue reliance on cathexis”
almost always produces a pathological complaint or ethical problem.
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[…] at once superstitious and not superstitious, there was a clear distinction
between his attitude and the superstition of uneducated people who feel
themselves at one with their belief. He seemed to understand that his
superstition was dependent upon his obsessional thinking, although at times he
gave way to it completely (TCH, p. 65).
Although the Rat Man has surpassed a stage of primordial dependency on and
reduction of the other (at which the ego is generated, and regression to which produces
psychosis), he remains fixated at this stage, bound to refer back to it, and is often
unable to think outside his ego without reference to superstitious apparatuses. These
apparatuses are antithetical to true relationality, in that their original purpose was to
reduce stimulation by reifying it.
Relationality can involve objects, but does not fixate upon them, as fixation
always implies a leveling, a desire to reduce an object from its exteriority, to force it
prematurely into immanence. The relational object must remain transcendental. Nontranscendental, or immanent experience can only involve actors seamlessly involved in
their milieu and which flow together and apart without boundaries. Relationality must
simultaneously involve boundaries as well as their transcendence, whereas immanence
collapses both boundaries and transcendence.
Only once relationality has become explicit, and not subordinated to imaginary
interests, can ethics become a possibility. Thus, catharsis leads, through its purgation of
the imagination, in the direction of a true ethics, which are impossible insofar as they
restrict the freedom of either the self or the other. This cathartic relation to ethics has
gone unacknowledged in a great deal of the Philosophical literature, which traditionally
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defines ethics as either a normative prescription of transcendental objects to be desired
and avoided or a purely theoretical description of ethical action which makes the entirety
of ethics into an immanent system, incapable of dealing with exteriority without reducing
it. The former definition of ethics provides guidelines for action, but suspends the
freedom of the actor, whereas the latter delineates and categorizes the kinds of ethical
action from which one can choose, posing ethics as a limited number of possibilities
(e.g., the trolley problems and other similarly contrived thought experiments that run
rampant throughout the ethical literature).
Philosophically, I do not seek to destroy traditional notions of ethics in this thesis,
but rather to highlight this cathartic dimension, which would allow for their meaningful
activity, by bringing ethical discussion out of fixation on paradoxical and
decontextualized problems. I am not interested in delineating a new ethical system to
compete with or replace the old ones, but instead of offering a standpoint through which
we may deepen our appreciation for and understanding of ethical theories and prepare
to put them meaningfully into practice. The practice of Psychoanalysis offers us a
unique perspective on the theory and practice of ethics in that it is not the role of
Psychoanalysis to teach its Analysands (i.e. clients/patients) ethics, while at the same
time retaining its ethicality. Though its employment of the cathartic method, it provides
its Analysands with the agency and ability to choose to be ethical (or not), instead of
being compelled helplessly in this way or that, compulsively carrying out ill-understood
actions. It is this process of bringing the Analysand to the point wherein s/he may
choose to live ethically that, in and of itself, constitutes the cathartic dimension of ethics
of Psychoanalysis.
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In spite of its cynical appearance, Psychoanalysis does not toss ethics aside in
favor a sensual hedonism or tyranny of physical pleasure. Anyone who steps out in the
world, or studies pathology and/or criminality can easily observe the tyranny of
hedonism. Psychoanalysis merely describes this in detail. Ethics involves not wallowing
or basking in their enjoyment, but becoming able to see beyond them. We will only learn
to see beyond a thing if we first understand it. Understanding, even of the pathological,
can lead towards health, which is undeniably a good. Jacques Lacan, as an orthodox
Freudian Psychoanalyst, told us directly that ethics is of central importance to
understanding the root concerns of Psychoanalysis:
Given all that is implied in this phrase, the ethics of Psychoanalysis will allow me
[…] to give you the most suitable instruments for understanding what is new both
in Freud‟s work and in the experience of Psychoanalysis that derives from it.”
(EP, p. 1).
Our understanding of the ethical dimension inherent to Psychoanalytic method will allow
us to understand the function of Psychoanalysis in a broader context. Analysis, as a
particular discipline, does not teach ethics (as this would be the role of philosophers,
clergy, and/or sages), yet everything in it points toward a purification of ethical practice
by focusing in on those elements which are most easily neglected, or instrumentalized
in the name of some higher good. The statements we find littered throughout Freud‟s
writings on the baseness of human life, inevitability of violence, barbaric sexuality, &c, I
understand to serve primarily as an acknowledgment of the overwhelming excess of
human failure and misery, while implicitly highlighting the miracle of the good, whenever
it occurs. It‟s not insignificant to note that catharsis most frequently occurs through
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tragedy, and this was the original context in which Aristotle discussed it. The pity excited
by tragedy exposes one‟s own fears. As Bernays wrote, the spectator of the tragedy
“beholds himself in the mirror of a being who is similar in kind to himself, and the pity
that he feels for the represented sorrow can throw back the reflex of fear into his own
inwardness” (p. 340). Tragedy thus has potential to expose latent pathology by
exposing the fears and insecurities that drive it, allowing it to be more easily treated. In
the same way that a body‟s convalescent response is the most painful aspect of injury
or sickness, tragedy can lead to psychological convalescence, if it is not indulged in for
its own sake (a tendency which, if not kept in check, can easily run rampant and lead to
its own pathologies). The horrors of Psychoanalytic theory offer us a unique opportunity
to confront the tragedies which are part and parcel of human existence. There is no
known human being, at any time in the past or present, regardless of their social status
or character, who has gone through life without sickness, tragedy, or death. Tragedy
would seem then to be inevitable. Nevertheless, it need not evolve into cynicism or
melancholy. Through the often-disturbing theories found in the Freudian corpus, we can
move towards something that may encompass this tragic nature of reality.
This does not mean, however, that there is a Psychoanalytic “prescription” to
give in ethical matters. The cathartic abreaction allows for the possibility of ethics, which
are impossible to practice in all but the most favorable circumstances, without forcing
their implementation or formalization. Of course, this is easier to describe than to
practice. True ideological neutrality is difficult, if not impossible to achieve. As
Laplanche & Pontalis note, “[…] neutrality, is, obviously, an ideal to be aimed at rather
than an absolute injunction.” (p. 272). It is to the degree that this very ideal is actualized,
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however, that catharsis (or purgation) of excessive cathectic elements can occur,
allowing for the possibility of the Analysand reaching the position of being confronted
with the ethical relation. The Analyst can only treat Analysands to the degree that s/he
has completed her/his analysis.
In the section titled “The Problem of a Psychoanalytic Ethics”, I will address the
cathartic dimension of ethics in Psychoanalysis by firstly dispelling the notion of
Psychoanalysis as a either a destruction of ethics or an ethical “education”, by
surveying Freud‟s thoughts on these matters. In the section titled “Formation of the
Ego”, I will lay out the developmental processes that occur during the formation of the
ego, leading to the ego‟s fantasized relations, which prevent ethics from occurring by
focusing on the work of Jacques Lacan and Melanie Klein. Finally, in the section titled
“The Cathartic Dimension of Ethics in Psychoanalysis”, I will summarize my main points
and try to wrap the paper up neatly. Theoretically, I attempt to build mainly from the
work of Sigmund Freud and Jacques Lacan, though I include some others as well. My
definition of “ethics”, I have inherited largely from Emmanuel Levinas, insofar as I define
this as a primordial relation of responsibility to the Other, experienced only as
exteriority. Psychoanalysis is not to be this relation (and neither can any practice), but
ideally lays the groundwork for it, by cathartically working-through the systematic
fantasies which obstruct relation to the Other.
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THE PROBLEM OF A PSYCHOANALYTIC ETHICS, FREUD‟S AVOIDANCE OF
IDEALISM
Finding the place of ethics in Psychoanalysis, is difficult, as we‟ve seen. It is
equally difficult to find them in any philosophy of mind. We may schematize this difficulty
as a tension between two poles. Firstly, we can, following the cynical path which halfinterested observers never fail to mistakenly discern in Freud‟s work, reduce ethics to a
naturalistic function or drive by explaining them entirely in terms of the promotion of life
and death in a biological organism (i.e., interpret ethics only as merely an expression of
drives for life/libido or death/thanatos). Secondly, we can attempt to sidestep Freud‟s
descriptions of the pitfalls of moralism, and interpret ethics as a purely prescriptive duty,
which, if followed renders us “good”, and if violated renders us “guilty”. The former
interpretation over-particularizes ethics, restricting its concerns to those concrete
variables affecting a particular organism only in relation to the concerns of its biological
function, causing ethics as a whole to approach atomistic imperceptibility, whereas the
latter over-generalizes it, making the application of ethics to particular situations
inapplicable to any concrete situation.
To the degree that one of these methods (of over-particularization or overgeneralization) is favored over the other, an ethicist becomes a spokesperson for the
biological drives against the conscience, or the conscience against the biological drives.
The tension between these two poles is what makes ethics into a hypostatized system,
which makes no allowance for exteriority. Relation to the Other (or others) is not a
completely structured, systematic discourse, as structure itself always implies a deferral
of relation. Completed discourse is a safety net for true relation, which is a prerequisite

15

for any ethical activity. Instead of attempting to mediate between these two poles or
synthesize them, I will, in what follows, attempt to show the place for an ethics of the
Other in Psychoanalysis, which is implied in the process of catharsis. Jacques Lacan
has laid the groundwork for this inquiry, as he has gone at least as far as any other
Psychoanalytic theorist (or philosopher) in taking Freudian theory to its furthest reaches
and beyond, while maintaining the centrality of ethical relation. So then, what I write has
origins in Freud‟s Psychoanalytic theory, but I am attempting to pick up a kernel of it,
deposited at the threshold of Psychoanalytic theory by Jacques Lacan, and take this
even further into the murky but fertile grounds of philosophical inquiry that surrounds
every discipline in its particularity.
If ethics is a problematic and highly disputed area of Philosophy, this is even
more the case in Psychoanalysis. Sigmund Freud described his view of ethics in
Civilization and Its Discontents as
[…] an endeavor to achieve, by means of a command of the super-ego5,
something which has so far not been achieved by means of any other cultural
activities. As we already know, the problem before us is how to get rid of the
greatest hindrance to civilization-namely, the constitutional inclination of human
beings to be aggressive towards one another; and for that very reason we are
especially interested in what is probably the most recent of the cultural
commands of the superego, the commandment to love one‟s neighbor as
oneself.” (p. 108).

5

Freud usually uses the term “superego” to refer to the reactive, authoritarian aspects of the conscience. These
are the aspects that serve to impose punishments on the conscious awareness of troubling impulses.
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This frames ethics as either hopeless, insofar as human aggressivity is unavoidable or
undesirable, insofar as it would only be achieved only through the meta-aggressions6 of
the super-ego. Indeed, morality itself, throughout the whole of Freud‟s work, is
understood to be highly problematic, and very often pathological. This, however, does
not indicate that Psychoanalytic theory is amoral, but that it is concerned with mapping
the subtle twists of desire, which can easily pollute even the most outwardly moral
actions. Ethics has often served as little more than a safe haven for many of the most
aggressive and chaotic impulses in human nature.
Perhaps one of Sigmund Freud‟s most enduring insights is that moralistic
behavior often functions as a cover for impulses one has learned to disown as
“immoral”. Our everyday desires have the capacity to produce within us a tremendous
conflict. This can lead us to construct rigid moral laws (enforced by what Freud referred
to as the “superego”) to prevent these deviant desires from finding expression
detectable by others who will recognize it as abnormal. This process of disavowal of the
drives leads to the construction of the superego that presides over the conscious mind
as a moral authority. It is impossible to ignore, however, that many of the cruelest
historical events have occurred under the guise of law. As Jacques Lacan wrote,
“Whoever attempts to submit to the moral law sees the demands of his superego grow
increasingly meticulous and cruel” (EP, p. 176). This cruelty is, in and of itself, a warped
expression for the impulses, which the superego dams up in the form of guilt. This
shows us that morality is a topic independent of the relation of authority to rebellion,

6

By this term, I attempt to designate Freud’s concern that any removal of aggression will only occur through its
displacement above or beyond what it used to be. Superegoic aggression is still aggression, only with an
authoritarian character
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both of which can be either moral or immoral. Authority is no more inherently moral than
rebellion against it is.
Neither can we equate guilt and innocence with morality. An overwhelming sense
of guilt can impel aggressive behavior at least as easily as an unshakeable sense of
innocence. Although we hear about immoral acts carried out in the name of some
purportedly innocent cause on a regular basis, this is far from being a universal
phenomenon. Many “wrongdoers” are capable of admitting that they know that what
they are doing is wrong, but that for one reason or another, they merely find their
impulses irresistible. The impulse to do things one knows is wrong can often find
strength in the sense that it is somehow transgressive, as Freud describes in the
following quote from The Ego and the Id:
It was a surprise to find that an increase in [an] unconscious sense of guilt can
turn people into criminals. But it is undoubtedly a fact. In many criminals,
especially youthful ones, it is possible to detect a very powerful sense of guilt,
which existed before the crime, and is therefore not its result but its motive. It is
as if it was a relief to be able to fasten this unconscious sense of guilt onto
something real and immediate (EI, p. 42).
If the feeling that one‟s impulse(s) have transgressed a moral law were an effective way
to prevent their active expression, one would think that guilty feelings, as an
acknowledgment of crossing a boundary, would act as a deterrent against carrying them
out. In many cases, however, we can see that guilt does precisely the opposite, and
produces a more robust buildup of tension to be resolved only through actualization.
This actualization would in turn feed the sense of guilt, which would yearn for
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actualization even more persistently in the future. This is what we may refer to as the
feedback loop of guilt, which oscillates between authoritarian morality and rebellious
immorality.
We may also trace desires back to their biological roots, and attempt to minimize
their repression by giving these supposed roots free rein to act as they please. By
accounting for desires naturalistically, normative, duty-based ethics begin to look more
and more like a system of repression aimed at inherent tendencies, which produce
tension through their very existence and will find relief through outward expression in
one way or another. This interpretation of ethics, taken to its limit leads to their reduction
under the heading of fully isolated and particularized biological impulses, which, insofar
as they are “natural”, must find recognition as what they truly are without the
superimposition of moralistic/ethical desires on top of them.
Following from this interpretation of ethical desire, ethical tension is a result of
the authoritarian nature of ethics itself, which denies the more primal impulses of a living
being. Pathology thus finds its origins in a primordial denial of natural inclinations that
are undeniable insofar as one participates in nature. Nature thus takes on the form of a
completed totality. The resolution of pathologies is then simple: liberate these natural
inclinations, let them flow freely. However, as in the literature of naturalistic liberation
(i.e. in the literature of libertines such as the Marquis de Sade), we do not find not a
natural agency liberated from oppressive morality. Instead, in libertinism, we find “[…] a
note of defiance, a kind of trial by ordeal in relation to that which remains the terminal
point of this argument, an undoubtedly diminished but nevertheless fixed term” (EP,
p.4). Libertinism depends not only upon an affirmation of a total(ized) naturalism, but
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also upon a rebellion against what is perceived to fall outside of it, thereby remaining
dependent upon it. It is more of a reaction to a perceived tendency towards ascetic
martyrdom, as Leupin points out in the work of Jacques Lacan, which “stresses the
complete failure of all experiences of sexual liberation, which have missed the renewal
of guilt inevitably associated with the emphasis on pleasure” (p. 65). This is not only the
case with sexual hedonism, but applies to all forms of naturalistic hedonism so well
typified in libertinism. Affirmation of nature, even as a totality leads even more to the
denial of what is seen as un-natural. Pleasure, insofar as it operates through rebellion,
confines itself to guilt, even in the act of disavowing it. Transgression of the moral order
takes on its meaning only in relation to the fixed term of the very order it escapes, or
else attempts to escape from. This means that, as something created, the moral order
only takes on meaning through continual creation. If it did not matter, there would be no
point in rebelling against it. This is part of the paradoxical insight that those who rebel
against an institution are often more convinced of its reality than the institution‟s own
members are.
It is true; however, that Psychoanalysis is easy to interpret as a theory of the
reduction of ethics through the naturalistic liberation of desire. If we define ethics as an
unleashing of biological desires for pleasure, Freud would seem to be in agreement with
us. He saw true pleasure as orgasmic, in the biological sense. He described intellectual
pleasure as “mild compared with that derived from the sating of crude and primary
instinctual impulses, [as] it does not convulse our physical being.” (CD, p. 30). Crude
and primary instinct is the phrase we ought to hold on to in this passage. For Freud,
what is crude is primary, and what is primary is crude, in that it precedes any structured
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reflection. Physiological processes “happen” before we have any structured framework
to “hang” them on. Similarly, the often-crude subject matter of Freud‟s writings, full of
sexual and violent themes, is less of a model for the practice of psychoanalysis (Freud
did not go out hunting for sexuality and violence, he merely listened for trends in the
complaints of his patients) than a lesson. These “crude” aspects of the mind are easy to
ignore, whether through prudishness, or through the methods of repression and
disavowal. Freud‟s work is as a testament to the ongoing importance of these issues,
and their role in the formation of pathologies. Psychoanalysis does not aim at reducing
the rest of life to desires for sexuality and violence (the life and death drives
respectively), but at delineating the ways in which we may easily become caught in the
throes of them. It shows us the manifold ways in which all meaning can be reduced to a
function, which exerts a tyrannical control over us, preventing us from freely
participating in the world of meaning.
Psychoanalytic theory differs from other psychological theories in that it does not
directly disclose the truth, nor does it provide a truth to believe or reject, but rather
seeks to find truth‟s location, in places overinvested with meaning. If Psychoanalysis
seems confronts the most strange and uncomfortable issues, this is precisely because it
is these issues which tend to be the most oversaturated with meaning. The anxiety
surrounding issues of “base drives” is precisely what is most telling about them. In his
seminar on The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, Jacques Lacan tells us
that “for analysis, anxiety is a crucial form of reference, because in effect anxiety is that
which does not deceive. But anxiety may be lacking.” (p. 41). This is especially true in
our media-saturated culture in which sexuality and violence have come to be the most
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common form of entertainment. It is easy to remain as a sleepwalking observer,
following along with things that would be incredibly anxiety provoking were they to take
on personal implications. On a literal level, when one wakes up from a dream during
sleep, it is the result of anxiety as Freud notes:
Anxiety dreams are mostly those whose material has undergone the least
distortion. If the demand made by the unconscious is too great, so that the
sleeping ego is not in a position to ward it off by the means at its disposal, it
abandons the wish to sleep and returns to waking life.” (OP, p. 56).
Like these anxiety-dreams, the work of Psychoanalysis is to show us the truth, wherever
it may be, without imposing a prepackaged meaning on our lives, or to suggest a path
down which we ought to walk. This anxiety brought on by Psychoanalytic theory is
nothing other than the anxiety of finally awakening from a slumber.
Although Freud‟s work is often disturbing in terms of its contents, I understand
this not as directly indicative of its metaphysical structure but as a method to jolt us
awake from the numbed-out apathy (or jadedness) towards life which constitutes the
surface layer of the long-term neurosis. His disturbing images of the animalistic, violent,
and incestuous human being are not models, but lessons. The first lesson in
psychoanalysis then, is that meaning isn‟t easy to maintain, and that truth is difficult to
face. Desire‟s trajectories are not for the faint of heart, as Lacan says, “what is called
desire suffices to make life meaningless if it turns someone into a coward” (EC, p. 660).
Just when one thinks one has been freely saying exactly what one wanted, there turns
out to be not only a structure, but an order to one‟s words. It is the pursuit of this order
to its point of genesis, which constitutes the real challenge. Although there is no
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psychoanalytic prescription as to how one is to behave, no moralizing suggestion as to
what one should enhance or remove in one‟s life, one is encouraged, first of all, to look
directly at it, owning up to any anxiety that arises.
The operation of ethics in Psychoanalysis, then, lies not in its revelation of
naturalistic functions of desire, nor in its discoveries regarding the function of guilt.
There is no prescription either to carry out one‟s moral duties, or to give free rein to a
subset of one‟s desires. Instead, the interrelation between transgressive desires and the
guilt that represses them finds exposure through the discovery of truth beyond illusion.
Only after this has occurred, will we be able to distinguish between what is truly ethical
and what merely appears as such. Both sociality (in the forms of guilt and shame) as
well as biology (in the form of naturalistic drives) as hypostatized in the form of egoimages obscure our situation and thereby undermine our freedom to make ethical
decisions in reality. If we are to move beyond their unmitigated influence, we must find a
way to give them freedom of expression, without giving one authority over the other. In
order to do this, we must look to the ego, as the locus of the conflict between
transgression and guilt.
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THE FORMATION OF THE EGO, A SYNTHESIS OF LACAN AND KLEIN‟S
DISCUSSIONS OF THE EGO WITH MY OWN OBSERVATIONS
If we were to ask a phenomenologist what it is that makes us free, the reply
would certainly be that if there is any freedom to be had, it would be in the ego (which,
understood as the most basic unit of consciousness, is merely another term for it). It is a
pity then, that the free ego always seems to turn out to be subject(ed) to something
else, whether its own desires, to public discourse, to neurology, or other static variables.
In spite of its freedom, consciousness, as Levinas writes in Otherwise than Being, “is
affected, then, before forming an image of what is coming to it, affected in spite of itself”
(OB, p. 102). Before we are able to produce an image of what affects our awareness,
whether neurological, social, or political, &c, we are affected on a more primordial level.
At early stages of physical development, affectedness is particularly difficult to
understand, due to its intensity and unpredictability. This results in the formation of
egoic objects through a process of cathexis. The undeveloped ego deduces from its
vulnerability the presence of unpredictable and often threatening forces outside of itself.
These forces eventually solidify into objects through the process of cathexis, which
makes the environment seem more predictable at the cost of free relation to it. Reality
takes on a spectral quality, populated largely by self-referential, cathectic affectivity7.

7

Even highly complex and nuanced discourses can take on this character (of spectral self-reference), insofar as
they purport to either reduce all possibility to actuality or provide the method to do so, requiring no reference to
exteriority. It is important not to generalize our fear of interiority, however. It would be easy to accuse GWF Hegel,
for example, of promoting a system of totalizing enclosure, but the often-neglected higher levels of his dialectic
deal primarily in the realm of possibility. Paradoxically, fear of totalization can easily encourage the complete
enclosure of relations.
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These cathexes, however, must be purged cathartically if true relation is to be
recognized8.
This interaction of the ego with what it is not (i.e. the Other) can lead to different
conclusions regarding its freedom. Often, when things are going smoothly,
consciousness seems free from superimposed structures, free to define itself however it
pleases, unobstructed by its affectedness. This state, however, is impossible to
maintain. Obstacles arise all too easily, if not in the form of our own miscalculations
regarding exterior events which subsequently illuminates the contingency of whatever
agency we experience, then in the form of raw, unvarnished misfortune. There may
indeed be such a thing as freedom, but if there is, it would seem to be a very delicate
state, difficult to acquire, and easy to fall out of. Once it‟s fallen out of, not only is the
contingency of our egoic agency revealed, but we often tighten the knot of dependency
ourselves by imagining all kinds of novel dependencies. As Freud reminds us:
As long as things go well with a man, his conscience is lenient and lets the ego
do all sorts of things; but when misfortune befalls him, he searches his soul,
acknowledges his sinfulness, heightens the demands of his conscience, imposes
abstinences on himself and punishes himself with penances (CD, p. 87).
The ego may have some notion of freedom, but is ultimately bound to circumstances
over which it has no control. This is a result of the fact that the ego itself is not an
original presence but is itself as much of an illusion as the objects it uses to stabilize its
world, and is generated through a specific process, tied up with specific worldly
8

This is where I differ from both Freud and Lacan, upon whose thought I have developed my own views. I assert all
cathexes to be egoic, and that what Freud referred to as the “superego” is merely a reaction to instinctual
functioning. I do not prioritize the ego metaphysically, but I do prioritize it as the universal locus of pathological
structuration. The goal of analysis is to move beyond purely egoic relations, which are by nature pseudo-relations,
through the method of catharsis. Analytic treatment targets the ego, but does not occur through the ego.
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conditions. This conditionality of the ego‟s genesis creates a profound schism with itself.
It experiences its essence as freedom, yet its origin is contingent. Thus, the ego is, at its
core, an illusion. It is surrounded by contingencies falsely understood as freedom and
freedoms falsely understood as contingency.
The illusion of the ego is provided through the medium of reflection. In his early
essay on the mirror stage, Lacan describes the ego‟s genesis as a moment of truly
narcissistic reflection (EC, p. 79). The ego arises out of a process in which an image
returns to itself, producing an identity or selfsameness. The ego is thus spectral or
illusory; it does not exist outside of the reflective medium. It is identity in the logical
sense of “a=a”, in which the “a” on the left is distinguished from the “a” on the right. At
early stages of life, this kind of experience may only occur in front of surfaces which are
reflective in a literal sense. Later, one may come to learn to see “reflections”
everywhere.
The atom reflects the cosmos, the self reflects the other, the child becomes the
parent, and the student becomes the teacher. “You” often becomes little more than a
reflected reversal of “I”. Although this may be comforting insofar as it allows for the
creation of a stable identity, it is also creates the armor of alienation (EC, p. 78). One
may see reflections of oneself in other people, animals or even inanimate objects, yet
discover an inability to relate to any of them. We may, like G.W. Leibniz, desire to think
like an atom, while losing the ability to understand the relations that occur in our own
lives. After all, anyone can imagine an atom, but it is impossible to imagine the other.
The unbinding of the ego‟s reflectivity is also the unbinding of reflective distortion. It is
easy to read all kinds of personal meaning into things not intended for us, because the
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function of egoic consciousness is essentially identification and nothing else. The self
wants to see itself in the other and reflect the other in itself. This process leads every
experience to solipsistically reflect back to the ego. Unbounded reflectivity allows
consciousness to imagine that it is everywhere. As Sass observes: “The mirror
experience, whether real or imagined, can be read as the ultimate fantasy of solipsistic
self-sufficiency- one that transcends solipsism‟s lived contradictions” (pgs. 129-130).
Mirroring allows one to think that even though one may remain dependent upon others
in many respects both psychological and physical, these others are in some way
identical with the self.
There is, then, in the genesis of the ego, a simultaneous dissolution of the self
into the other and the other into the self. In his famous “Memoirs of My Nervous Illness”,
Daniel Paul Schreber first describes the inessentiality of every individual soul, or self:
It was granted to no human soul to remain aware for all eternity of having been
this or that human being. It was rather the destiny of all souls to merge with other
souls, and to integrate with higher entities, remaining only aware of being part of
God (p. 52).
Nonetheless, in spite of all of the intertwining of selves, reflection ensures that the final
image will be given narcissistically. After all, if the self were truly to absorb otherness,
the result would be omnipresence and omnipotence, in brief, godhood. Although he
speaks of the dissolution of individual self, Schreber finds his personal individuality
swollen to unprecedented proportions, claiming that
[…] everything that happens is in reference to me. Writing this sentence, I am
fully aware that other people may be tempted to think I am pathologically
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conceited; I know very well that this tendency to relate everything to oneself, to
bring everything that happens into connection with one‟s own person, is a
common phenomenon among mental patients. But in my case the very reverse
obtains.
At the genesis of the ego, regressed to in psychosis, notably as it is recounted in
Schreber‟s memoir, boundaries between self and other are both nonexistent and
omnipresent. Schreber himself is fully aware that what he is describing is a common
symptom of psychosis (thoughts of reference), yet he cannot shake the feeling that this
experience is his in particular. His experience is irreducible to that of others, and others
to himself. At the same time, he acknowledges the inevitability of merging on a
metaphysical level with others. Reflectivity, when universalized, becomes little more
than an exercise in futility. No reflective medium can ever perfectly reflect the original
content, and the more mediums involved, the more damage is done to the original
message. The universe becomes a house of mirrors with no escape. The ego‟s genesis
in reflection thus points to an obfuscation of communication, an inability to allow for
relationality, which requires both individuals and their transcendence without dissolution.
This reflection is an empty exercise because the ego is itself devoid of content.
Because it is by nature this very reflective process, it does not take on substance or
depth. As much as we repeat the “a=a” identity, it is impossible to shake the sense that
there is more than one “a” present. The larger the portion of reality that the ego takes
up, the more reality takes on a spectral, illusory quality. This illusory quality implies a
kind of neutrality, insofar as one is unaffected by experiences understood to be illusions.
As Lacan puts it, “The ego experiences reality not only insofar as it lives it, but insofar
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as it neutralizes it as much as possible” (EFT, p. 100). Just as a mirror with too many
cracks becomes useless, any unpredictability or reminder of the outside world (whether
misfortune or surprise) makes obvious the ego‟s illusory nature.
Just as the mythical figure Narcissus peered ever more closely into the pond
reflecting his image until he drowned, the reflective ego moves ever closer to the
surfaces that reflect it, and will eventually discover its discrepancy with them, or else
lose its self in them. This discovery of discrepancy exposes the imaginary nature of the
ego, and thereby is not only experienced as an act of aggression, but also provokes it to
re-disguise itself. As Lacan notes, the ego aggression9 is “[…] linked to the narcissistic
relationship and to the structures of systematic misrecognition and objectification that
characterize ego formation” (EC, p. 94). The genesis of the ego occurs when one first
identifies one‟s own reflection (this “a=a” identification), and begins to refer the world to
oneself, however, in spite of reflectivity‟s de-intensification of primary (instinctual)
processes, needs, and desires, danger and chaos remain present. As Sass writes, “[...]
even the achievement of absolute epistemological centrality cannot bring total serenity”
(p. 123). Un-bounding the process of identification and making everything into a
reflection of one‟s self can only occur after the process of identification has taken place,
and as such can do nothing to interfere with the identification process of which it is a
mere epiphenomenon.
Although the ego subsists only as a reflective image, it is surrounded by other
images as well, which are either swept up in its self-identification process (as objects),
or else are disavowed (disowned), subsequently becoming adversaries in the ego‟s

9

The ego, as both imaginary and secondary, is not the source of this aggression. Rather, ego aggression has its
origins in primary (instinctual) processes channeled through the ego.
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“struggle” against what it is not, and drowns it in its own image. As Lacan wrote, “the
ego appears, for its part, in the world of objects, as an object, though a privileged one to
be sure” (EFT, p. 177). The important thing to note is that these objects, while distinct
from the ego, are not outside of the ego in any meaningful sense. In the same manner
in which the solipsist believes that everything in the world is a product of his or her
imagination, the ego‟s objects are nothing but (often distorted) surfaces upon which it
projects itself. A reflection implies two images: one an original, and the other a copy.
The genesis of the ego involves not only limitless projection outwards (aggression in
pathological states), but limitless receptivity inwards (paranoia in pathological states).
This dynamic is what, if left unvarnished, leads to psychosis, in which all boundaries
between self and other are collapsed. It is typified in Daniel Paul Schreber‟s “Memoirs of
My Nervous Illnes”, in which he painstakingly describes not only extreme narcissistic
agency (projection) but suspension of all freedom (receptivity), becoming a mere puppet
of an Other‟s will: “since my nervous illness took [a] critical turn, my nerves have been
set in motion from without incessantly and without respite” (p. 47). The ego‟s generation
produces a dialectic between aggression and paranoia. This can only be superseded
through further developments which serve to contextualize the ego.
All that I discussed above served to highlight the ego as a fertile ground for
pathology and for all manner of destructiveness to find expression through.
Nevertheless, it is important to remember that although pathology makes its most
obvious appearance in the egoic plane (or imaginary register), we may illustrate
metaphorically the revelation of pathology in the ego as the appearance of the
organisms which cause a disease under a microscope. The ego is a medium through
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which pathological elements become legible, treatable, and comprehensible. In their
original state, they were blind(ing) impulses, which the growing child could not handle.
The ego thus serves a purpose other than the mere distortion of relations through
reflective illusion. It reduces the intensity which flows freely throughout the world, and
which one comes into contact with as time progresses. As Laplanche writes, it is “the
agency whose function is precisely to moderate the frenetic circulation of affect in which
the primary process consists […]” (p. 39). It arises in early childhood to allow for the
management of disruptive impulses, which affect the child from without. This leads to an
oversimplification of the world, experienced only as imaginary, but it also leads to an
ability to grapple with the world without the blind impulse of mechanical force. This early
stage, in which the ego presides unilaterally over a world of image-object receptacles, is
structurally analogous to psychosis, in which the universe becomes a grand unified
mirror. In both cases, the line between reality and imagination is blurred, or absent. This
ambiguity between imagination and reality gives rise to fear and paranoia. When the
ego is undisturbed in its rule over life, it experiences any weakness in the potency of its
fantasy as the product of outside aggression.
In at the point of the ego‟s genesis, Otherness functions as a threat to the
solitude of the imaginary ego, plagued by constant anxiety about an invasion from the
outside. Defenses are built up to counter the “persecutory” forces of the Other which the
ego has been unable to integrate. As Klein wrote, “the characteristic defenses are
chiefly aimed at annihilating the „persecutors‟, while anxiety on the ego‟s account
occupies a prominent place in the picture” (p. 264). Inversely, paranoia and aggression
are increased by the thought that one could serve as the Other for an other. Similarly,
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Lacan stated in his seminar on The Other Side of Psychoanalysis that “All acts of
bastardry are based on the fact of wishing to be someone‟s Other, I mean someone‟s
big Other, in which the figures by which his desire will be captivated are drawn.” (p. 61).
Paranoia while seemingly directed at objects, is always undergirded by an anxiety which
is itself objectless, and which, as I noted earlier, is an indicator of close proximity to
reality. As disturbing and dangerous as paranoid acts can be, consciousness receives
its foundation in this state, insofar as it occurs at all. A child‟s fear of monsters lurking in
hiding spots bears an uncanny resemblance to paranoid delusions of persecutors acting
through elaborate means (as, for instance, in Schreber‟s description of God‟s
manipulation of his nervous system). Psychosis is never an entirely novel development,
but a regression to the ego‟s formation. Even the more common pathologies (neuroses)
which have a subtler symptomatology do not involve an active regress to the formation
of the ego, but an insufficient transcendence of it. As Freud notes in his study on
Schreber, and his most thorough inquiry into the nature of psychosis, in the case of
Psychotics, “[…] the patients themselves […] possess the peculiarity of betraying (in a
distorted form, it is true) precisely those things which other neurotics keep hidden as a
secret.” (TCH, p. 83). As Juan-David Nasio tells us, “we all have a seed of insanity that
does not affect our stability; a localized madness we ignore” (p. 82). Although the ego is
typically not the primary means of functioning in most healthy adults, it is always
present, and insofar as it is present, so will be the fantasies which make it what it is.
The ethical is completely out of the question in the register of the ego. Before
anything else, ethics are always relational, and as such cannot occur in any state in
which relation is a mere illusion, as in the ego, which exists only in a phantasmic
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identity-relation to itself. The ego, however, is not un-ethical, but pre-ethical. It does not
operate (even in its aggression) as a testament to immorality, but to pre-morality. The
ego clearly displays what it is that prevents ethics from occurring insofar as it arises out
of an excessive instinctual frustration. The ego does not tell us where to find pathology,
but instead shows us through its very existence.
In order to move beyond this primordial psychosis rooted in the ego, a catharsis
must occur. Through catharsis, the psyche jettisons the cathectic residue that remains
in the ego. This requires an ability to purge the images that repetitively define its activity.
Moving beyond the ego means the discovery of transcendence in the Other, the
noumena, the unthinkable. Instead of seeing the world as object-receptacle for it to fill in
with its imaginative projections, or of itself as a receptacle for the world, a revelation
occurs that the ego is inadequate to produce relationality, in that it follows a specific
circuit defined by the primary process of which it is epiphenomenon. With this discovery,
the pre-ethical nature of egoic life becomes explicit. Responsibility and guilt often arise,
as Klein wrote, “the ego comes to a realization of its love for a good object, a whole
object, and in addition a real object, together with an overwhelming feeling of guilt
towards it” (p. 270). An object, as Klein refers to it, is not merely another reflective
surface. We may question somewhat whether the term “object” is even appropriate for
it, as an object is typically instrumentalizable. What Klein describes as the good, whole
object is no longer thinkable as a mere image-receptacle for the projections of the ego,
or as an interrogator with a direct line to the innermost recesses of the mind. The good,
whole object, is necessarily exterior to the ego. It does not need the ego to take on its
own meaning. The ego then realizes the invasive and even violent nature of its previous
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relations with objects (both actively and passively), which brings on (as cited in Klein
above) feelings of profound guilt. This guilt is of a unique kind, however, in that it is
simultaneously guilt for aggression, as well as guilt for paranoia, neither of which need
to have had any relation to reality. Up to this point, the behavior of the ego is a-moral. It
can be neither good nor bad, because no true relation is capable of occurring (other
than reflection, which operates as a kind of deferral of relation).
Although the passive/active, solipsistic ego in its early stages seeks out a
narcissistic pleasure in all of its object-reflections, the ego, after discovering the good,
whole object (which is in fact the Other), ceases or at least tempers its delusional
objectification process. This suspension or tempering of projective-objectification, I
interpret as the essence of what Freud referred to as the latency period. This period of
latency following the exclusive predominance of egoic function can also be interpreted
as the stage of mourning, referred to by Klein as “the depressive position”. In the
depressive position, the ego is
made to realize that the loved [good] object is at the same time the hated one
(which through its persecution inspired paranoia); and in addition to this, that the
real objects and imaginary figures, both external and internal, are bound up with
each other” (Klein, p. 285-6).
The grandiose yet volatile egoic relations of the past are transformed into responsibility
to allow for a genuine relation to an object that is complete in itself and has no need for
the intervention of the ego. Similarly, during the stage of latency described by Freud,
sexuality becomes unconscious, and no apparently hedonistic behavior can be
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detected. The point to be derived here is that with the ego‟s discovery of an irreducible
exterior, its instrumental attitude withers.
Relation with the whole object (which can also be described as Otherness or
Noumena), unencumbered by projection and other imaginary processes can only take
place through the symbolic: “It is necessary for the symbolic system to intervene in the
system conditioned by the image of the ego so that an exchange can take place,
something which isn‟t knowledge, but recognition” (EFT, p. 52). Instead of knowing what
it relates to, as in earlier stages, the ego recognizes its place in symbolic relation to the
whole object, this first true Other. A symbol is merely something which is given, and
which is subsequently interpreted. The ego, at this stage, can even discover itself as a
symbol, as well as symbolizable, which previously would have been unthinkable due to
its reflectiveness, as Lacan notes, “The ego isn‟t just a function. From the moment when
the symbolic system is instituted, it can itself be used as a symbol, and that is what we
are considering” (EFT, p. 52). If solipsism is incapable of one thing, it would be
symbolization, which requires a clear distinction between self and other. In order for
solipsism to be surpassed, the ego must overcome its status as mere reflector and
reflected. It must become a symbol.
With the ego held in place by its symbolic position for the first time, it can, finally
meaningfully engage in symbolic discourse, both producing symbols as well as
interpreting them. Whereas during previous stages of development, the ego could only
encounter partial objects capable of producing feelings of either paranoia or grandiosity,
the ego can now differentiate between objects and the discourses in which they
participate. At this point, communication is dialogical: the ego enters into a symbolic
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exchange with the Other. Only at this point is there a true relation, and thereby ethics is
capable of taking place. Ethical language is dialogical10, a free relation, but with symbols
taking on contextual meaning.

10

I take this position contrary to the position of Jacques Lacan, for whom the dialogue is always on the cusp of
breaking down. This may be true, but the fact remains that any subordination of dialogue to discourse prevents
the free circulation of symbols, and thus returns us to a hierarchical system awaiting a rebellion, not a situation in
which the other may be freely responded to.
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THE CATHARTIC REFERENCE TO ETHICS IN PSYCHOANALYSIS
In a lucid moment, Sigmund Freud wrote, “it may be said of the id that it is totally
non-moral, of the ego that it strives to be moral, and of the super-ego that it can be
super-moral and then become as cruel as only the id can be” (EI, p. 44). Following from
this, it would initially have made the greatest amount of sense for us to look for
Psychoanalytic ethics in the place of the ego, if not in actuality then at least in
potentiality. Upon closer inspection, however, we have discovered the ego to be the
locus of a primordial illusion, thereby unable to relate to anything outside itself, except
through its own narcissistic apparatuses. Only in working through the reflectivity of the
ego can we discover the possibility of true relation, and therefore ethics. The goal of
Psychoanalytic ethics is to bring about a paradigm shift: a decentralization of the ego.
We produce this shift by the cathartic process of purging excessive imaginary objectcathexes, which act as artificial barriers to true relationality, which by nature respects
the integrity of all involved parties. Between the transgressions of the unconscious id
and the transcendence of the superego‟s moral law, a space opens up in the place of
the ego, through catharsis, in which immanent relation to the Other becomes possible: it
is this which references ethics. It references ethics because it is not yet ethics itself.
Catharsis leads to the possibility of ethics, a move beyond the pre-ethical, not their
consummation, which cannot occur in the context of psychoanalysis. While therapy of
every kind targets the pathological, it does not and cannot produce health, which occurs
freely and of its own accord when pathological influences have subsided.
Psychoanalysis has been critical, historically (as in Sigmund Freud‟s Civilization
and its Discontents), of the field of ethics insofar as they are profoundly easy to abuse
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and/or misunderstand. Given the fact that people subscribing to all manner of ethical
theories (or lack thereof) are afflicted with pathological states, it would be completely
uncalled for, for Psychoanalysis to endorse or condemn any of them11. The ethical
undercurrent of Psychoanalysis thus remained unspoken, inheriting the signature
cynicism of Sigmund Freud, who denied any formalizable relation of human goodness
to actuality. Like all cynics, however, Freud was a fallen idealist. His hopes for humanity
remained too fragile to withstand the severe and degrading blows dealt to them by the
cruelty of historical contingency. Reality is blighted, impossible to reconcile with
goodness and truth, leading to its interpretation as inherently unjust and/or
incommensurable with ideality, safely concealed behind a curtain of obscurity. Although
he refers in a letter to Oskar Pfister to his often-disappointed “high ideal”, Freud
mentions nothing but disappointment as to its actualization:
I do not break my head very much about good and evil, but I have found little that
is „good‟ about human beings on the whole […] no matter whether they publicly
subscribe to this or that ethical doctrine or to none at all. […] If we are to talk of
ethics, I subscribe to a high ideal from which most of the human beings I have
come across depart most lamentably (PF, p. 61-2).

11

It will be argued in response that certain ethical positions are associated more closely with pathological states
than others, and this may indeed be the case. When confronting a concrete situation in which morality has taken
on a pathological character, however, we must always remember that pathological ethics are not un-ethical, but
pre-ethical. Any attempt to uproot or encourage specific ethical doctrines would lead to the creation of
interminable political and/or religious entanglements, which do a great deal to prevent any therapeutic effect from
occurring, and discredit Psychoanalytic practice in general. Rather, in the same sense that bodily medicine is both
politically and religiously neutral, so should Psychoanalysis be. Freud’s writing on religion, for instance, should not
be taken as advocacy for atheism but as a diagnosis of the potentially destructive aspects of religion when it is
blended with psychopathology. This is why I have focused on the treatment of pathological egoism in this thesis.
The ego, treated as an imaginary construct, provides a neutral meeting ground for the psychological treatment of
all individuals regardless of political or spiritual persuasion.
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Here, we see perhaps the most explicit mention in the entire Freudian corpus of Freud‟s
underlying moral idealism and its obscure but undeniable relation to his far more easily
identifiable pessimism about humanity. It‟s no secret that Freud held out little hope that
humans would ever recover from their conniving, chaotic, and hedonistic ways. For one
reason or another, he chose to keep his hopes to himself. Perhaps we thought that
expressing them would have been unprofessional. I propose that this idealism is in
reality a silent precursor to Psychoanalysis writ large, and has its clearest manifestation
in the cathartic method Freud employed at early stages. Later, his increasing concern
with the delineation of pathological states resulted in a neglect of his motivating aims,
which would likely have guided his work in a different direction. This ideality continued in
latency throughout psychoanalytic thought to this day, in the form of an unspoken
idealism, a reluctant idealism that, in its hesitancy to misrepresent reality, has given the
impression of being a cynicism which has led to a great deal of unwarranted backlash
from critics. I am attempting to develop this idealistic direction to bring it out into the
open a little more, in order to produce a therapeutic effect on ethical thought, which is in
our times caught in a deadlock between various conflicting prescriptive schemas.
The catharsis of the ego leads us beyond deadlock. What it does lead us to has
various titles in the literature (alterity, exteriority, difference, otherness, the absolute, the
good, &c), all of them easily hypostatized, folded into new ego-objects, but never failing
to stimulate the hopes of humanity for a better future, and faith in the necessity of
progress. The process of hypostasis of ideality is predictable, even in its more playful
variations, for instance, as in the case of alterity, as Levinas points out: “Right off, a
stakes, money or honor, is attached to it” (OB, p. 6). Money and honor, both being
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solidifications of radical desires aimed in the first place beyond their source. In the ego,
these desires find a stable place to enter the repetitive circuit of identity, in which they
can return eternally, giving off the illusion of being different each time. This illusion must
persist, to obscure the irreducible banality of an all-encompassing stasis.
Even the term “catharsis” itself has often become little more than a catchphrase
referring first and foremost to a specific spectrum of violent and/or sexual expression,
whose supposedly transgressive content has become more acceptable for the masses
than the activity which supposedly repressed it. The life and death instincts,
universalized in the forms of violent and sexual entertainment, reduced to trite
predictability, offer no outlet for the infinitely aporetic processes of the human mind.
Catharsis, if it is to live up to its title, must present us with a route towards a true
alternative, and a plausible one. It must not merely accelerate the frequency at which
one suppressive schema replaces another, sweeping everything up in its process. It
must not merely find a more stable schematic to more smoothly accommodate the
world. It must open out onto reality itself.
In the context of our material lives, in a literal sense, nothing is ever supposed to
be the same. No two shapes or numbers are identical as soon as they are materially
inscribed. Yet banality comes forth so easily. If all were purely material, there would only
be difference, (or otherness, exteriority &c), and banality would be impossible to detect.
It is only the persistence of the embodied ego, which allows for a feeling of return, the
very return which Freud termed “cathexis”. It has long been known, however, that this
ego is imaginary, and the only dispute appears to revolve around how necessary it is to
preserve it. Materialists reduce it to neurological functioning, while spiritualists
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universalize it, turning the entirety of the cosmos into its mirror (called “the holographic
universe”, by Michael Talbot). The genesis of the cathexes, which make the ego
identifiable, does not itself occur in the ego, which is by nature contentless.
Catharsis involves a reference or gesture towards ethics because the purging of
the ego‟s hermetic self-enclosure results in a confrontation with reality as a newfound
exteriority, which is undeniably an opening on to the possibility of the good. It is on this
level that I make a departure from traditional psychoanalytic theory, which posits reality
as inherently traumatic, in a morally neutral sense. If one is willing to set aside the
biases inherent to cynicism that run rampant throughout theories of the mind, it is easy
to understand. The argument I put forth against this perennially fashionable cynical
impulse towards reality is very simple, but I believe it is effective.
It is always a safe assumption to make, that reality (truth) is always better than
illusion (falsity). Naturally, the rebuttal to this claim will be that sometimes it is preferable
for the truth to remain hidden. Contained within this rebuttal, there is a deep
misunderstanding. One‟s reason for hiding the truth is always in the interest of
something thought to be better. Now imagine, hypothetically, that this hiding of the truth
were not necessary to achieve the desired end. Would it not then be preferable to reach
this end without concealing the truth? In the classic example of a murderer who comes
to one‟s house in search of victims, who asks where to find them, for instance, would it
not be preferable to tell the truth to the murderer, but in such a manner that no violence
would result? If such a thing were possible, it would be a miracle in the truest sense,
and the highest form of morality, being all the better for having involved no lies. Once
we set aside the cynical arguments concerning the supposedly tyrannical nature of
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reality, which supposedly forces us to constantly make moral compromises, it is easy to
see that truth/reality is a virtue and a good before it is an abusive trauma. Now, I do not
intend to go so far as to argue that truth/reality is the highest good, but merely that it is a
good wherever it occurred. No degradation has ever occurred through the discovery of
truth/reality. If the discovery of truth/reality activates an immoral chain of events, the
truth-teller cannot be blamed for the immoral outcome, but only perhaps for not having
told enough of the truth, which includes not only the factual details of a situation, but the
meaning of it as a whole. Partial truths can, it is doubtless, be harmful, but they are
precisely harmful because of their partiality, not because of their truthfulness.
It is only when truth and reality are separated from meaning that they become
fearsomely traumatic or evil, and solidify into pathology. This is the reason why events
are often so much more horrifying before we discover the context in which they
occurred. Contextualization always has the effect of producing meaning, and at its best,
of remedying the chasms that open up in the course of life. With the passage of time,
even things that seemed meaningless as they occurred gradually take on a well-defined
role in the flow of things. This does not diminish the absurd trauma that overwhelmed
the mind, but shows that even traumatism has a place in the development of the world.
Of course, trauma can be expanded to cosmic proportions, but so can anything
else. It is only in the context of the infinite that meaning becomes truly problematic. The
reasons we discover to account for events become in this context flimsy and
unconvincing. Especially in the context of Philosophical thought, which, from its very
origins, has sought the eternal in the temporal, everything comes to take on an infinite
reality, which leads to a mood that is simultaneously ecstatic and traumatic. When this
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infinite reality is separated from infinite meaning, it opens up the possibility for infinite
trauma. The paradigm example of this phenomenon is post-idealistic modern
philosophy, which, in both its existentialist and positivistic variants, denies any
association between meaning and reality, in favor of an independent ego, immune to
absorption by any categories larger than it is.
As I discussed in chapter two, however, the ego comes into being in the first
place at the site of a trauma, brought about by an excess of affectedness at an
immature stage before the proper apparatuses are in place to allow for a meaningful
response. The ego then forms imaginary cathexes in order to account for this helpless
affectedness. These cathexes, however, hypostatize meaning, keep it self-referential,
and prevent it from connecting to exteriority, or otherness. This leads to the whole of
reality becoming potentially traumatic, because it is only encountered non-relationally.
Wherever illusion is transcended, there is an opportunity to encounter reality.
This is why catharsis, as purgative of the illusions of the ego, leads directly to the door
of ethics. In order for ethics to function, it is obvious that there must first be contact with
reality. Any ethics unrelated to reality would be rendered completely incomprehensible,
as reality itself is a necessary predicate of any fully developed ethics. The egoic
imaginary, with its unified and illusive reflectivity is by nature pre-ethical. If ethics are to
become possible, there must be a reference beyond this. There are perhaps many ways
that this can be done, but I have found that the tactic which most adequately leads in
this direction is that which has been described as “catharsis”. Through catharsis, the
ego, following its purgation, can come to serve as a lens for the mind, which is all to
easily mistaken for the ego, especially in the case of those who would have us believe
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that the mind is the same entity as consciousness. The truth is quite the contrary. The
unconscious mind is still the mind, and the ego represents an infinitesimal vanishing
point in comparison to the entities encountered mentally, whether consciously or not.
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CONCLUSION
I will use the last few paragraphs here, to sum up the ground I have covered. In
the first section of this paper (“The Problem of a Psychoanalytic Ethics”), I explored the
possible misunderstandings of the nature of ethics, which lead to the erroneous
conclusion that either Psychoanalytic theory is without an ethics, or what is worse,
attempts to do away with them. I described two theoretical poles, which lead to this
mistake. One pole leads to error through overparticularization of the ends of desire,
refusing to recognize any desires other than those that have their origins in the objectoriented drives of the individual, aimed at completing a particularity. This theoretical
structure, typically attributed to Psychoanalysis (in some cases with good reason), leads
to the reduction of ethics to a vanishing point. Following this approach, everything,
whether idea, emotion, desire, or drive, is reduced to an atomistic component. It is
unilaterally opposed to any thought of universality or cosmology. These atomistic
components are incomprehensible, in every respect other than the pull they exert on the
subject, which we can think of as the drive, the givenness of a predefined lack. On the
opposite end of the spectrum, we see ethics expanded to a superstructure that perfectly
delineates ethical norms and imposes guilt on any violations of them. This
superstructure, by delimiting freedoms, also limits them to such a great degree that
ethics can no longer be practiced freely, and consequently become impossible. Finally,
it becomes clear that both of these methods for defining ethics ultimately diminish them.
In the case of the universal and the particular, as well as any combination of the two, we
find ourselves trapped in determinism, with no hope of understanding either what
produces the determination (the universal) or what is determined (the particular). I thus
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looked for ethics elsewhere, discovering that the relation between these two poles is
one of anxiety, and this anxiety will point us to the location of a non-reductive ethics
(beyond over-abstraction and over-particulatization).
In the second section of the paper (“The Formation of the Ego”), I explored the
genesis of the ego, illustrating how the ego is in itself incapable of ethics, being in its
essence pre-ethical. At early stages of development, the ego is incapable of functioning
ethically, in that it oscillates between states of passivity and solipsism, and thereby
cannot enter into any true relation outside of the imaginary superstructure that it either
imposes or is imposed upon it. I understand the ego‟s genesis as revolving around the
process of reflectivity, as described in the work of Jacques Lacan.
The ego is generated to, through cathexes, reflect, and deflect excess impulses,
but this very reflection and deflection can easily fill the entire ego. Eventually, however,
the ego discovers the presence of a complete “object” outside of itself, which allows it to
purge itself or else to be purged of cathexes, which allows for an encounter with
otherness, instead of imaginatively imposing on it or receiving its impressions. The ego,
purged of cathectic dross becomes less of a mirror than a space through which
relationality occurs. This relationality freely flows between the universal and the
particular, capable not only of interacting hierarchically, but immanently as well. It is this
possibility of immanence which allows for ethical practice to be distinguished from mere
authoritarianism (top-down ethic) or rebellion (bottom-up ethics). Similarly, it is what
allows Psychoanalysis as a practice to be ethical without teaching ethics. The
analysand, like any individual, must discover what goodness is for his or her self, for
virtue cannot be taught. It can only be given, as a gift, free of obligations and subscript.
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If the analyst were to give a gift the analysand, it would be a gift the analysand has paid
for, and not only with money, but with time, effort, and perhaps a great deal of
psychological trauma. One does not pay for a gift. The giver can expect nothing in
return.
In the third and final section of the paper, I discuss the role of ethicality in
general. After the catharsis (purgation) of the ego, we come to a confrontation with
ethics itself. The role of Psychoanalysis then, concerning ethics is to reference to them
through its very ethicality. In truth, this reference towards ethics is not strictly the work of
Psychoanalysis, but any work that seeks what is good. At the end of the completion of
any good work, one finds oneself together with the other, facing the other, as Levinas
wrote in Ethics and Infinity: “in the interpersonal relationship it is not a matter of thinking
the ego and the other together, but to be facing. The true union or true togetherness is
not a togetherness of synthesis but a togetherness of the face to face” (p. 77). Ethics
cannot make choices for us, but rather puts us in the position of being able to make
ethical decisions, in the same way that, more broadly, Philosophy at large “does not
indicate a choice, but articulates the situation of being „in the position of making a
choice‟” (Raffoul, p. 2).
Every institution, whether university, psychoanalytic, business, politics, family, &c, is
incapable of enforcing ethicality, but must instead aim towards bringing its subjects to
the point at which they may come to the position of being able to practice ethics in the
true sense. Ethical practice must not force goodness out into the world, but promote the
building of a capacity to receive goodness from wherever it may come, all the while
recognizing that it can never be owned. What is good can only be given freely and it
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likewise can only be truly received through a willingness to give. Ego-fixation results in
an inability to do either. A young child cannot do good or evil, because s/he remains
fixated on the reversibility of relation. It is the goal of ethicality to bring us to maturity,
and the ability to act freely. Although Psychoanalysis is far from being the only theory
and/or institution to be ethical in this sense, it is through our exploration of its bleak and
often unnerving implications that we may learn to confront the greater traumas we can
expect to face in life, without sugarcoating them.
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ABBREVIATION KEY
-CD: Sigmund Freud, “Civilization and its Discontents”
-EC: Jacques Lacan, “Ecrits”
-EFT: Jacques Lacan, “Book II: The Ego in Freud‟s Theory and the Technique of
Psychoanalysis”
-EI: Sigmund Freud, “The Ego and the Id”
-EO: Jean Laplanche, “Essays on Otherness”
-EP: Jacques Lacan, “Book VII: The Ethics of Psychoanalysis”
-FFC: Jacques Lacan, “The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis”
-OB Emmanuel Levinas, “Otherwise than Being”
-OP: Sigmund Freud, “Outline of Psychoanalysis”
-OSP: Jacques Lacan, “Book XVII: The Other Side of Psychoanalysis”
-PF: Psycho-Analysis and Faith: The Letters of Sigmund Freud & Oskar Pfister
-TCH: Sigmund Freud, “Three Case Histories”
-TI: Emmanuel Levinas, “Totality and Infinity”
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